Introduction:
Yesterday, September 18, 2014, the US Senate reaches a bi-partisan deal to allow President Barack Obama fund and arm Syrian Moderate Rebel Forces in its quest to conquer and eliminate the Islamic State Militants in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) saga. Noble as the initiative is, we cannot deny the fact that most Americans, including most members of Congress, do not know exactly who a Syrian Moderate Rebel is in the context of the new mandate handed to Mr. President. So who is a moderate rebel in Syrian, worthy of American trust and engagement? That is the issue. Unfortunately, the honorable lawmakers did not vouchsafe a definitive answer to assuage those nursing misgivings about the mandate. To arm is not the issue, but managing the goal and the outcome. We want to reinstate as we stated in our
previous essay that in international diplomacy arena, there is a universally
accepted belief that there are no permanent friends or allies, but permanents
interests. Given that as true, there is no period, no history, and no situation
more urgent than now for that principle to be on a full blast in Damascus at
the instance of Washington, with a view to enabling unhindered channel for
integrated logistics support for the dismantling of ISIS and everything that it
represents. When President Obama made the declaration a few years ago that there
won't be American combat boots on the ground in Syria, there was no ISIS, there was no beheading of American freelance journalists, or an American Aid
Worker facing imminent death, and there was no suicidal match for experimentation with the idea of an Islamic Caliphate in another sovereign territory. In other words, the lives of innocent citizens, the interests of America or those
of its allies were not at stake or threatened at that point in time. Today, it is a different story. In every respect imaginable, this is a just war. Therefore, we
cannot, and must not downplay the need for more combat boots on the ground in
Syria. And on the issue of arming the Syrian Moderate Rebel Forces, though the efficacy of that proposal appears promising, we ask that the US Government tread with caution.
Understanding the Limitations of the Moderate Syrian
Rebel:
From our usual common sense
perspective, a Moderate Syrian Rebel is a member of the Free Syrian Army - an
insurgent who came into the crisis scene in Syrian following the escalation of
the "Arab Spring", imbued with a genuine sense of national pride, and
with a goal to terminate the Assad's dictatorship, but not fully embroiled in the indiscriminate destruction of human lives reputed of
ISIS and the Assad forces.
Without mincing words, I want to maintain
that arming the Free Syrian Army, without the direct involvement of the
coalition forces in the real combat, will not vanquish ISIS from the occupied
territories as reasonably needed. In addition, the underlying grievances,
mostly political and abuse of human rights and related issues must be addressed
simultaneously with the quest to annihilate ISIS; otherwise, Syria will remain
a vast land of unequal rights and justice, and a testing ground for every form
of Islamic ideology.
The fact that the
so-called moderate rebel forces are NOT at the moment engaged in forceful
indoctrination of the unwilling or embarking on territorial expansion drive does not qualify them as moderate rebels, deserving of our arms and
trust. It is not about vetting as some pundits and military experts are suggesting. It is
about trust, and whether they are genuinely and favorably disposed to Western
values, interests, and objectives.
Indeed the impulse to overthrow
President Assad for all his past records of human rights violations is
compelling, but we should take cognizance of the fact that a greater majority
of his adversaries are unrepentant Islamic militants who, given the chance, will never and can never be salvaged, or expected to embrace Western secular culture and democratic
values.
More troubling is the question of managing the liberation process - who will exercise jurisdiction over the occupied land, if eventually ISIS is
defeated and evacuated.
Will the coalition forces and the
moderate rebels, after the expected defeat of ISIS, turn their weapons on Assad
and his forces, with a view to forcing Assad out of power in Syria?
Or will Syria degenerate into two
mini-sovereign nations - one under the control and leadership of Assad, and the
other under the control of the international coalition and the moderate Free Syrian Army?
It is not enough to defeat and
vanquish ISIS, without addressing the civil war in Syrian that gave life to
ISIS in the first case. Attention should be extended to how to manage the
intended defeat as well as ending the un-winnable civil war. The isolation of
President Assad and his troubled nation in the past years provided a fertile ground for Islamic fundamentalists to experiment with barbarism. That has to end.
From all indications, the so-called moderate rebels are not a formidable force, militarily. They couldn't withstand the military strength of Assad Forces and they have been similarly humbled by the more aggressive and brutal ISIS.
In other words, these are not the forces or a formidable group that, under the prevailing circumstances, you will expect to form a viable government in Syria after the defeat of ISIS or the unlikely capitulation of Assad.
Given that as true, the international coalition must strive to integrate the political solution with a military approach. The political turmoil and ethnic intolerance in Iraq in the past three years are crucial enough for a guide
Dealing with Tribal Loyalty and Minority Agenda:
Syria is not Egypt. Egyptians rebelled against the Mubarak Administration collectively as a people. There was no tribal warlord taking advantage of the pro-democracy protest to inflict maximum damage on President Mubarak and his administration for years of domination. And there was no visible tribal or ethnic group fighting on the side of President Mubarak to frustrate the purpose of the pro-democracy movement.
With regards to the Muslim
Brotherhood, it was a different story – they were neutral all through the
nights and days that the protest lasted in Cairo, waiting patiently to occupy
the vacuum expected to be created in the lead following the demise of The Mubarak Administration.
As expected, being the most
viable and well-organized group existing then, the Muslim Brotherhood was able
to mobilize its followers within a record time, cashing in on the anti-Mubarak
momentum to win the Presidential election that was called by the interim
Military Government. But the newly elected President Mohamed Morsi got it all
wrong. He did not let go the Islamist in him, and he was vanquished.
Granted Egypt is predominately a Muslim country, truth is, President Mubarak was not overthrown because he is secular-leaning or a tribal warlord. He was overthrown because Egyptians wanted a taste of real democracy. Not a dictatorship or an Islamic Government that President Morsi was incubating.
Granted Egypt is predominately a Muslim country, truth is, President Mubarak was not overthrown because he is secular-leaning or a tribal warlord. He was overthrown because Egyptians wanted a taste of real democracy. Not a dictatorship or an Islamic Government that President Morsi was incubating.
In a similar vein, the people of
Tunisia were fed up with an oligarchy that lacked socio-political agenda
aimed at improving the well-being of its people.
With respect to the Algerians, they simply had enough of corrupt political leaders and successive governments that notoriously lacked any clue on how to manage its vast oil wealth and overcome the concerns of the proletariat.
With respect to the Algerians, they simply had enough of corrupt political leaders and successive governments that notoriously lacked any clue on how to manage its vast oil wealth and overcome the concerns of the proletariat.
(By the way, my term paper in the
"International Petroleum and Comparative Law and Policy" class - one of the classes that I took when I was in graduate school - was on the 2005 Algerian Hydrocarbon Law,
as amended in 2006. So the statement above referencing the Algerian oil wealth
and corruption is not guesswork. Sonatrach, the Algerian state oil behemoth,
and the most powerful state-owned oil company in Africa, before it was
dismantled, was more powerful than the state).
In sum, the anger, the
joblessness, and the feeling of anti-establishment in Tunisia and Egypt that
led to the evolution of the “Arab Spring” were not motivated by tribal or
ethnic or religious factors as we saw in Syria and Libya.
Therefore, President Obama and
the international coalition must tread softly in arming the so-called moderate
rebels inside of Syria. Because when it is all over, you will still have a
substantial member, if not a majority, of the Syrian people backing President
Assad.
To put it succinctly, a minority rule or regime in Syria is not sustainable. America cannot afford to 'babysit' another adolescence regime - Islamic or secular - in hostile territory.
To put it succinctly, a minority rule or regime in Syria is not sustainable. America cannot afford to 'babysit' another adolescence regime - Islamic or secular - in hostile territory.
It is now left to Mr. President
and his security team to separate the wheat from the chaff with a view to
avoiding creating another Afghanistan’s mujaheddin funded by America in the
1980s during the Afghan war with the old Soviet Union.
Conclusion:
I want to hesitate to
conclude that the international community headed by the US Government, is
resisting the inevitable. Undermining the political angle to the civil war in
Syria is not a smart move. The ISIS phenomenon, though overwhelming, is a
collateral issue in the Syria saga. Ending it does not automatically eliminate
the underlying grievances that compelled the civil war in Syria. In addition, Syria is not Gadhafi’s Libya where the
pro-government forces collapsed under intense pressure from the international community. President Assad has
real and highly motivated followers who are willing to sacrifice their lives
for their President. The facts on the ground speak volumes to that. If
President Assad is vulnerable he would have since long gone, given the
multi-dimensional attacks his forces and administration have received from
ISIS, the Free Syrian Army, the international community as well as other
interested parties in the past three years. Liberation of ISIS-held territories
will not completely eliminate the political crisis in Syria. Same way as the
defeat of Assad forces, if ever it happens, will not enshrine the elusive peace
in the polity. The situation requires concerted and well-coordinated military
and political solutions – an inclusive government or complete dismantling of
the country into multiple independent states along tribal boundaries. I rest my
case.
- Mr. Alex Aidaghese.